A novel image protection scheme called \cocktail watermarking" is proposed in this paper. We analyze and point out the inadequacy of the modulation techniques commonly used in ordinary spread spectrum watermarking methods and the visual model-based ones. To resolve the inadequacy, two watermarks which play complementary roles are simultaneously embedded into a host image. The new watermarking scheme guarantees that, no matter what kind of attack is encountered, at least one watermark can survive well. We also conduct a statistical analysis to derive the lower bound of the worst likelihood that the better watermark (out of the two) can be extracted. With this \high" lower bound, it is ensured that a \better" extracted watermark is always obtained. From extensive experiments, results indicate that our cocktail watermarking scheme is remarkably e ective in resisting various attacks, including combined ones.
Introduction
Transferring digitized media via the Internet has become very popular in recent years. However, this frequent use of the Internet has created a need for security. As a consequence, to prevent information which belongs to rightful owners from being intentionally or unwittingly used by others, information protection is indispensable. A commonly used method is to insert watermarks into original information so that rightful ownership can be declared. This is the so-called watermarking technique. An e ective watermarking procedure usually requires satisfaction of a set of typical requirements. These requirements include transparency, robustness, maximum capacity 27], universality, oblivious detection, and resolution of ownership deadlock 5, 32] .
In the following paragraph, we will brie y review some existing watermarking methods. Other surveys regarding watermarking can also be found in 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 24, 29, 33] . In the literature, Koch and Zhao 13] transformed an image by using block-DCT transform and then utilized a pseudorandom number generator to select a subset of blocks. A triplet of blocks with midrange frequencies was slightly revised to yield a binary sequence watermark. This seems reasonable because low frequency components are perceptually important but easy to sense after modi cation, and high frequency components are easy to tamper with. Macq and Quisquater 20] suggested hiding data in the least signi cant bits such that the embedded data is imperceptible. Their watermark is easy to destroy using attacks such as low-pass ltering. Cox et al. 4 ] proposed a global DCT-based spread spectrum approach to hide watermarks. They believed that the signal energy present in any frequency is undetectable if a narrowband signal is transmitted over a much broader bandwidth. Ideally, this will cause a watermark to spread over all frequencies so that the energy in any single frequency is very small and, thus, undetectable. Their watermark is of xed length and is produced from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. They distribute as fairly as possible the watermark to the rst 1000 largest AC coe cients. An objective measurement was proposed to evaluate the similarity between the original and the extracted watermarks. Hsu and Wu 12] used multiresolution representations for the host image and the binary watermark. The middle frequencies in the transformed wavelet domain were selected for modi cation using a residual mask. Their method has been shown to be e ective for large images and for JPEG-based compression at higher bit rates. Bender et al. 3 ] also altered the intensities of a host image within a small range and hoped the updates were perceptually unnoticed. However, there are limitations in the above mentioned methods: (i) it is unclear where the watermark can be hidden and to what extent modi cation can be made to nd the compromise between the transparency and the robustness requirements; (ii) owing to inadequate robustness, these approaches are not suitable for practical use.
In order to improve the rst drawback, the characteristics of the human visual system (HVS) have been incorporated into the watermark encoder design 6, 25, 29] . It is very meaningful and reasonable to take HVS into account because of its inherent features. If one can modify an image based on rules taken from the human visual system, then it will be easier to generate an imperceptible watermark with maximum modi cations, and the length and strength of a watermark can be adaptive to the host image. Basically, a watermarking scheme that does not su ciently utilize the capacity of a host image may cause the potential length and strength of a watermark to be bounded.
The second drawback mentioned above is, in fact, a major problem associated with current watermarking techniques. Generally speaking, current watermarking approaches are not strongly robust to attacks or combinations of several attacks, so that their use is limited 10]. In this paper, this problem will be seriously addressed. We shall begin by introducing two famous works 4, 25] , which are frequently cited. The rst one is the spread spectrum watermarking technique proposed by Cox et al. 4] . Their method has become very popular and has been employed by many researchers 2, 8, 9, 26] . The other one, proposed by Podilchuk and Zeng 25] , is a human visual model-based watermarking scheme. Their work has also been extensively cited 6, 8, 25, 28] . However, the reasons why the two aforementioned methods are successful or not are still unclear. We shall investigate the modulation techniques used in 4, 25] and clearly point out their drawbacks. We assert that in order to obtain high detector responses, most of the transformed coe cients of the host image and the watermarked image have to be modulated along the same direction. This is the key concept needed to improve the previous approaches because a watermark detector can produce a high correlation value only when the above mentioned condition is satis ed. We have observed that an arbitrary attack usually tends to increase or decrease the magnitudes of the majority ( 50%) of the transformed coe cients. In other words, the chance that an attack will make the number of increased and of decreased coe cients equal is very low. In this paper, we propose an e cient modulation strategy, which is composed of positive modulation (increasing the magnitude of transformed coe cients) and negative modulation (decreasing the magnitude of transformed coe cients). The two modulation rules simultaneously hide two complementary watermarks in a host image so that at least one watermark survives under di erent attacks. Therefore, we call the proposed watermarking scheme \cocktail watermarking." The proposed cocktail watermarking scheme can embed watermarks rmly and make them hard to simultaneously remove. We have also conducted a statistical analysis to derive a lower bound, which provides the worst likelihood that the better watermark (out of the two) can be extracted. With this \high" lower bound, it is ensured that a \better" extracted watermark is always obtained. Experimental results con rm that our watermarking scheme is extremely robust to di erent kinds of attacks, including combined ones. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no other single watermarking technique that can resist so many attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we shall introduce the random modulation technique commonly used in conventional watermarking methods and propose a new modulation strategy called \complementary modulation" to satisfy the robustness requirement. In addition, statistical analysis is conducted to compute the lower bound of the worst likelihood that the embedded watermarks may be extracted. The combined and balanced attacks will be addressed in Sec. 2.4. Our cocktail watermarking scheme, including encoding and decoding, will be presented in Secs. 3 and 4, respectively. In Sec. 4.2, we shall provide false negative/positive analysis of bipolar watermark detection. Experimental results will be given in Sec. 5, and concluding remarks will be made in Sec. 6.
Modulation Strategy
In the transformed domain, watermark modulation is an operation that alters the values of selected transformed coe cients using every selected coe cient's corresponding watermark value. In Section 2.1, we shall introduce and analyze the modulation techniques commonly used in the existing watermarking methods and point out the inadequacy of random modulation. Section 2.2 will brie y analyze the behaviors of transformed coe cients when attacks are encountered. Section 2.3 will describe how to embed two watermarks which play complementary roles into a host image by means of the proposed \complementary modulation."
Random Modulation
Two very popular watermarking techniques, which take perceptual signi cance into account, were presented in 4, 25]. Cox et al. 4 ] used the spread spectrum concept to hide a watermark based on the following modulation rule:
where I i and I m i are signi cant DCT coe cients before and after modulation, respectively, and n i is a value of a watermark sequence. is a weight that controls the trade-o between transparency and robustness. In 25], Podilchuk and Zeng presented two watermarking schemes based on a human visual model, i.e., the image adaptive-DCT (IA-DCT) and the image adaptive wavelet (IA-W) schemes. The watermark encoder designed for both IA-DCT and IA-W can be generally described as 
where I u;v and I m u;v are DCT or wavelet coe cients before and after modulation, respectively. J u;v is the masking value of a DCT or a wavelet based visual model, and n u;v is the sequence of watermark values. It is found from both embedding schemes that modulations take place in the perceptually signi cant coe cients with the modi cation quantity speci ed by a weight. The weight is either heuristically determined 4] or depends on a visual model 25]. Cox et al. 4 ] and Podilchuk and Zeng 25] both adopted a similar detector response measurement described by (n; n e ) = n n e p n e n e ; (3) where n and n e are the original and the extracted watermark sequences, respectively. If the signs of a corresponding pair of elements in n and n e are the same, then they contribute positively to the detector response. A higher value of (n; n e ) means there is stronger evidence that n e is a genuine watermark.
In Eq. (3), high correlation values can only be achieved if most of the transformed coe cients of the original image and the watermarked image are updated along the same direction during the embedding and the attacking processes, respectively. This is the key point if a watermark detector is to get a higher correlation value. However, we nd that neither 4] nor 25] took this important factor into account. In fact, the modulation strategy they adopted is intrinsically random. Usually, a positive coe cient can be updated with a positive or a negative quantity, and a negative coe cient can be altered with a positive or a negative quantity as well. In other words, 4] and 25] did not consider the relationship between the signs of a modulation pair, which is composed of a selected transformed coe cient and its corresponding watermark value. This explains why many attacks can successfully defeat the above mentioned watermarking schemes.
Analyzing the Behaviors of Transformed Coe cients under Attacks
In the following analysis, we will assume that the watermark sequence n is embedded into a host image H. For represents a positive/negative transformed coe cient modulated with a negative/positive watermark quantity. For a noise-style watermark with a Gaussian distribution of zero mean and unit variance, the probability of drawing a positive or a negative value is roughly equal to 0:5. In the wavelet domain, the wavelet coe cients of a high-frequency band can be modeled as a generalized Gaussian distribution 1] with the mean close to 0; i.e., the probability of getting a positive or a negative coe cient is roughly equal to 0:5. The lowest frequency component is, however, only suitably modeled by a typical Gaussian distribution with the mean far away from 0. That is, the probability of obtaining a positive coe cient is extremely di erent from that of obtaining a negative coe cient. When wavelet decomposition is executed with many scales, the lowest frequency component is tiny. Therefore, the probability of getting a positive or a negative wavelet coe cient is still close to 0:5. For the transformed coe cients in the DCT domain, the number of positive and that of negative global DCT coe cients are statistically very close to each other. Hence, no matter whether the DCT or the wavelet domain is employed, the probabilities of occurrence of the four types of modulations are all very close to 0:25 due to their characteristic of randomness. We have also observed the in uence of a number of attacks to see how they update the magnitude of each transformed coe cient. The behaviors of attacks can be roughly chassi ed into two categories. The rst category contain those attacks like compression and blurring, which tend to decrease the magnitudes of most of the transformed coe cients of a watermarked image. Under these circumstances, it is hoped that every transformed coe cient can be modulated with a quantity that has di erent sign. The reason why the above modulation strategy is adopted is that it can adapt to compression-style attacks and enables more than 50% of the modulated targets to contribute a bigger positive value to the detector response. As a result, we can conclude that of the four types of modulations, only Modu(+; ?) and Modu(?; +) will contribute positively to the detector response. On the other hand, the second category contain those attacks such as sharpening and histogram equalization, which have the tendency of increasing most of the magnitudes of transformed coe cients, then every constituent transformed coe cient should be modulated with a quantity that has a same sign. Under these circumstances, only Modu(+; +) and Modu(?; ?) will contribute positively to the detector response. From our observations, we nd that using the random modulation proposed in 4, 25] , about 50% of the transformed coe cients can be increasingly modulated, and that the other half are decreasingly modulated. Therefore, it can be concluded that the random modulation strategy does not help the detector response value increase at all. We believe that a better modulation strategy should take the behaviors of attacks into account.
A New Modulation Strategy
In this section, we shall propose a new modulation scheme which can resist di erent kinds of attacks.
It is noted that the detector response de ned in Eq. (3) is a function of n and n e . Basically, n is a hidden watermark and is, therefore, xed once it is chosen. However, the values of n e are dependent on the strength of an attack. Because we are concerned with preserving the consistency of modulation directions instead of the degree of changes, the watermark value is de ned in the bipolar form, that is,
where t is a real number. Let the extracted watermark be n e ; it is determined from the sign of a piece of retrieved information using the bipolar test described in Eq. (4). It is noted that the following derivations are suitable for di erent types of watermarks (bipolar, noise, or gray-scale watermarks).
The main di erence is that the nal detector response may re ect a totally di erent result.
If a watermark image has been attacked and the coordinates in the transformed domain are (x; y), then the extracted watermark can be expressed as n e (i) = n e (map(x; y)) = bipolar(T a (x; y) ? T(x; y)) = bipolar((T a (x; y) ? T m (x; y)) + (T m (x; y) ? T(x; y))) = bipolar( 1 + 2 ); i = 1; 2; :::; L M ; (5) where T(x; y), T m (x; y), and T a (x; y) represent the original, the modulated, and the attacked transformed coe cients, respectively. The mapping function map forms a one-to-one mapping (which will be described in Sec. 3) which maps a selected transformed coe cient to its corresponding watermark index. From the analysis described in Sec. 2.2, it is clear that in order to obtain a high detector response, the signs of n(i) and n e (i) have to be the same. We can derive from Eq. (5) that there exist two possible conditions under which n(i) and n e (i) will have the same sign. First, if 1 and 2 have the same sign, then bipolar( 1 + 2 )(= n e (i)) and bipolar( 2 )(= n(i)) will be the same (scenario 1 in Fig. 1 ). The second condition is that 1 and 2 have di erent signs, but that j 1 j < j 2 j. Under these circumstances, the modulated amount is larger than the amount altered by an attack. In other words, the applied attack is not strong enough to in uence the sign change created by the modulation process. Introduction of the second condition is necessary to obtain a higher detector response because it intrinsically makes use of the masking e ect of the human visual model and, thus, maximizes the hiding capacity. Scenario 2 in Fig. 1 illustrates the above mentioned phenomenon. In this paper, the human visual model is introduced to help determine the maximum capacity allowed to embed watermarks. More speci cally, masking, the e ect of a visual model, refers to the fact that a component in a given visual signal may become imperceptible in the presence of another signal, called a masker. This refers to a situation where a signal raises the visual threshold for other signals around it. For a given visual distance and display resolution, it is possible to determine the just noticeable distortion (JND) for each spatial frequency from speci ed wave functions. Psychologists have experimented with several contrast sensitivity functions (CSF) from some speci c wave functions, such as the DCT basis function 21] and wavelet 31]. Since wavelet transform is very powerful in image representation, we shall use the wavelet-based visual model 31] to determine the maximum capacity that is allowed for a watermark encoder.
Complementary Modulation
In what follows, a complementary modulation strategy will be presented. The proposed scheme embeds two watermarks, which play complementary roles in resisting various kinds of attacks. The values of the two watermarks are drawn from the same watermark sequence. The di erence is that they are embedded using two di erent modulation rules: positive modulation and negative modulation. 
The embedding rule that speci es the condition n(m(x h ; y h )) H s;o (x h ; y h ) < 0 is called \negative modulation (NM)." The set R M nm is altered and becomes a new set, R M nm , after an attack. The set of elements R A nm , which indicates the locations where the embedding and the attacking processes behave consistently, should be identi ed. This set can be expressed as follows: 
where H a nm (x h ; y h ) is the attacked wavelet coe cient. Since the modulation and the attack processes behave in the same way at (x h ; y h ), n(m(x h ; y h )) n e (m(x h ; y h )) > 0 holds and contributes positively to the detector response. On the other hand, a \positive modulation (PM)" event for watermark encoding can be de ned as n(m(x h ; y h )) H s;o (x h ; y h ) > 0. Therefore, the set of locations whose corresponding coe cients are increasingly modulated in magnitude, P M pm , can be de ned as For an attack that favors negative modulation, most ( 50%) of the wavelet coe cients will decrease in magnitude. Let P A nm be the probability that wavelet coe cients will be decreasingly modulated (in magnitude) by an attack provided that the embedding rule \negative modulation" has been employed. (10) where jSj denotes the number of elements in the set S. Ideally, the condition P A nm = 1 only holds for an attack whose behavior completely matches negative modulation. That is, all the coe cients of the original image and the watermarked image decrease. In fact, it is di cult for an attack to match the behavior of negative modulation completely. Therefore, the relation jR A nm j jR M nm j holds.
Furthermore, under the assumption that the attack favors negative modulation, 
From Eq. (12), we know that more than or exactly 50% of the pairs of (n( ; ); n e ( ; )) will have the same sign and, thus, will contribute positively to the detector response. These pairs result from the fact that more than or exactly 50% of the wavelet coe cients' magnitudes decrease. Similar procedures can be deduced to compute P A pm given that positive modulation has occurred. One may ask what will happen if we do not know the tendency of an attack in advance. Fortunately, since our approach hides two complementary watermarks in a host image, at least one modulation will match the behavior of an arbitrary attack with the probability, P A , guaranteed to be larger than or equal to 0:5; i.e., P A = MAXfP A nm ; P A pm g 0:5:
Complementary Modulation under Combined Attack and Balanced Attack
As discussed in Sec. 2.3.1, our complementary modulation scheme can tolerate a great number of attacks. However, robustness against a combined attack or a balanced attack has not been addressed. In this section, we shall explain how our scheme can survive under a combined attack or a balanced attack. First of all, we must de ne what a combined attack is. In this paper, a combined attack is de ned as an attack composed of several (more than one) attacks of the same type or of di erent types.
Recall that watermarks are encoded in a host image using the positive/negative modulation rules so as to yield so-called positively/negatively modulated watermarks. If one can positively/negatively modulate almost or more than 50% of the transformed coe cients of the negatively/positively modulated hidden watermark, then the embedded watermarks are said to have been successfully removed. Practically speaking, this is the only way to make our cocktail watermarking scheme fail. However, it is extremely di cult to correctly guess most of the positions of the two embedded watermarks even if an attack is organized in a combined form.
On the other hand, a balanced attack is an attack which is able to either increase or decrease the modi ed image pixels within a close approximation. One may argue that such an attack will successfully remove most of our hidden watermarks. However, one can nd that results obtained after a balanced attack are similar to those obtained after performing a combined attack. We shall describe some experiments which were conducted to check the robustness of our scheme under combined attacks and balanced attacks in Section 5. The overall performance analysis will be discussed in Sec. 4.2.
Cocktail Watermark Encoding
The cocktail watermark encoding algorithm was developed based on the assumption that the original image (host image) is gray-scale. The wavelet transform adopted in this paper is constrained such that the size of the lowest band is 16 16. Here, the hidden watermark is either a noise-style watermark or a bipolar watermark. Gray-scale and binary watermark hiding can be found in our previous work 16, 19] . A noise-style watermark is Gaussian distributed with zero mean and unit variance. On the other hand, a bipolar watermark value is de ned as the sign of a noise-style watermark value, and the magnitudes of the Gaussian sequence are used as the weights for modulation.
Selection of Wavelet Coe cients
The region used to hide watermarks is divided into two parts, i.e., the lowest frequency part and a part that covers the remaining frequencies. It is noted that the lowest frequency wavelet coe cients correspond to the largest portion of a decomposition. Hence, di erent weights may be assigned to achieve a compromise between transparency and robustness. Similar to 25], only the frequency masking e ect of the wavelet-based visual model 31] is considered here. Owing to the lack of waveletbased image-dependent masking e ects, heurictic weight assignment needs to be used.
Before the wavelet coe cients of a host image are modulated, locations for embedding must be selected. A set of wavelet coe cients is selected if their magnitudes are larger than their corresponding JND thresholds. Because two complementary watermarks need to be hidden, the length of each watermark should be one half the amount of the total of the selected coe cients. Therefore, the watermark designed using our approach is image-adaptive 25]. In addition, the two watermarks are embedded in an interleaving manner. The relationship between the selected wavelet coe cients and the drawn Gaussian sequence is a one-to-one mapping. The mapping function is de ned as map(x; y) = 8 > < > :
where (x; y) is the coordinate in the wavelet domain and i is the index of the Gaussian sequence, G.
The locations in the wavelet domain which correspond to positive/negative values will be assigned to employ positive/negative modulation rules. In what follows, we shall describe in detail the proposed complementary modulation rules.
Complementary Modulation Rules
As discussed in Sec. 2.3.1, the signs of a selected wavelet coe cient and its corresponding watermark value are very important in our complementary modulation scheme. To modulate wavelet coe cients for complementary watermark hiding, the watermark sequence (n) is sorted in increasing order according to their magnitudes. After sorting, let n top =n bottom refer to a watermark pixel, which is retrieved from the top/bottom (usually negative/positive value) of the sorted sequence. The watermark embedding process proceeds as follows. For each pair of wavelet coe cients, H s;o (x p ; y p ) and H s;o (x n ; y n ), which come from the selected coe cient sequence with map(x p ; y p ) = 1 and map(x n ; y n ) = ? H m s;o (x n ; y n ) = 8 > < > : H s;o (x n ; y n ) + J s;o (x n ; y n ) n top w; H s;o (x n ; y n ) 0 H s;o (x n ; y n ) + J s;o (x n ; y n ) n bottom w: H s;o (x n ; y n ) < 0: 
where bipolar( ) serves as a bipolar watermark value.
Negative modulation:
H m s;o (x n ; y n ) =
H s;o (x n ; y n ) + J s;o (x n ; y n ) bipolar(n top ) jn top wj; H s;o (x n ; y n ) 0 H s;o (x n ; y n ) + J s;o (x n ; y n ) bipolar(n bottom ) jn bottom wj:
Based on the above mentioned positive and negative modulations, the mapping relationship between the position of a selected wavelet coe cient and the index of its corresponding watermark value can be established as map(x; y) = 
These mapping results will be stored for watermark detection and kept secret such that pirates cannot easily remove the hidden watermarks. As a result, in the watermark detection process, we search for the positive/negative signs of map(x; y) to detect watermarks embedded based on positive/negative modulation rules. Furthermore, the positive/negative values of map(x; y) determine the index of hidden watermarks. Fig. 2 illustrates our watermark hiding process. based on the assumption that the largest coe cients were not easily attacked. It is found that the robustness of the above mentioned oblivious modes is not guaranteed due to the lack of a precise way to predict the original image. Currently, the original image is still needed to extract watermarks due to the lack of a reliable oblivious watermarking technique. Basically, the need for a host image is suitable for destination-based watermarking 25].
Watermark Detection
Noise-style Watermark Detection
From the watermark modulation procedures described in Eqs. (15) and (17), the extracted noisestyle watermark, n e , is generated by means of a demodulation process as n e (map(x; y)) = H a s;o (x; y) ? H s;o (x; y) J s;o (x; y) w ; (21) where map is a mapping function, and H s;o (x; y) and H a s;o (x; y) are the original and the distorted wavelet coe cients, respectively. The detector response is then calculated using the similarity measurement described in Eq. (3).
Bipolar Watermark Detection
The extracted bipolar watermark value, n e ( ), is expressed as n e (map(x; y)) = bipolar(H a s;o (x; y) ? H s;o (x; y)): (22) To calculate the detector response for bipolar watermarks, the correlation coe cient adopted by Kundur and Hatzinakos 14] is used: (n; n e ) = P n(i)n e (i) L M ; (23) where n(i) ( Fig. 3 illustrates the complete procedure used in our watermark detection process.
Performance Analysis of Bipolar Watermark Detection
The probabilities of false negative (miss detection, failure to detect an existing watermark) and false positive (false alarm) can be estimated to support the proposed watermarking method. Here, we use a bipolar watermark as an example to compute all necessary estimations. In general, the probability of false negative (fn) using our cocktail watermarking can be derived as P CW fn = Pf (n pos ; n e pos ) < T & (n neg ; n e neg ) < Tja watermarkg = Pf (n pos ; n e pos ) < Tja watermarkg Pf (n neg ; n e neg ) < Tja watermarkg = P pos fn P neg fn ; (26) where T is the threshold used to decide the existence of an extracted watermark. Eq. (26) is derived based on the fact that the two events, (n pos ; n e pos ) < T and (n neg ; n e neg ) < T, are independent. It should be noted that if multiple watermarks are embedded using the same modulation rule, then all the events will be the same. Index pos/neg denotes that the watermarks are embedded using the positive/negative modulation rule and n/n e represents the original/extracted watermark. Since the hidden watermark value is bipolar, the original and the extracted watermark values either have the same sign (i.e., n t (i)n e t (i) = 1) or have di erent signs (i.e., n t (i)n e t (i) = ?1), where t 2 fpos; negg. It can be shown that P n t (i)n e t (i) (27) P neg fn can be derived in the same way.
The derivation of P pos fn or P neg fn is similar to that of Kundur and Hatzinakos 14] , but the result is extremely di erent since p 1 is found using a di erent modulation strategy. If p 1 is predicted to be 0:5 such as in 14] or other methods which use random modulation 4, 25] , then the probability of false negative is
However, it should be noted that the probability, p 1 , in our scheme is lower bounded by 0:5. It can be expected that our false negative probability will de nitely be smaller than those obtained using other methods. Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that it does not help reduce false negative to embed multiple watermarks with the same property 4, 25]. The false positive (false alarm) probability, on the other hand, can also be derived as in 14].
The threshold T can be set automatically using Eq. (26) if a desired false negative probability is given. Under the condition that the watermark length L M and the threshold T are xed, our false negative probability is the lowest among the existing methods using random modulation. If we want to reduce the false negative probability, T has to be decreased but at the expense of increasing the false positive probability.
Relocation for Attacks that Generate Asynchronous Phenomena
In this section, we shall present a relocation strategy for solving the asynchronous phenomena caused by attacks. In what follows, we shall introduce some attacks of this sort. StirMark 22] is a very strong type of attack that defeats many existing watermarking techniques. Analysis of StirMark 22] has shown that it introduces unnoticeable quality loss in an image with some simple geometrical distortions. Jitter 23] , which leads to spatial errors in images that are perceptually invisible, is another example. Basically, these attacks cause asynchronous problems. Experience tells us that an embedded watermark is often severely degraded 16] when these attacks are encountered. Therefore, it is important to deal with such an attack so that damage can be minimized. It is noted that the order of wavelet coe cients is di erent before and after an attack and might vary signi cantly under attacks having the inherent asynchronous property. Consequently, in order to recover a \correct" watermark, the wavelet coe cients of an attacked watermarked image must be relocated to their original positions before watermark detection is executed. In the relocation operation, the wavelet coe cients of the attacked watermarked image are re-arranged into the same order as those of the watermarked image. Generally speaking, by preserving the orders damage to the extracted watermark can always be reduced. In the experiments, one can nd that the detector response measured after applying the relocation step is signi cantly improved.
Experimental Results
A series of experiments was conducted to verify the e ectiveness of the proposed method. The experimental results are reported in the following.
Bipolar Watermark vs. Noise-style Watermark
This experiment was intended to show that the detector responses obtained by embedding a bipolar watermark were superior to those obtained by embedding a noise-style watermark. Figs. 4(a) and (b) show a watermarked image and its brightness/contrast attacked version, respectively. Basically, the histogram of the watermarked image is signi cantly changed after the attack. Fig. 4(c) shows the noise-style watermark detection results against 1000 randomly generated watermarks. The two correct noise-style watermarks were located at the 400 (using the relocation strategy) and the 800 (without using the relocation strategy) positions, respectively. It is obvious that the detector responses of the two correct watermarks are indistinguishable among the 1000 detector responses. However, when a bipolar watermark was used, the resultant detector response corresponding to the correct watermark could be uniquely identi ed as shown in Fig. 4(d) . This example illustrates that even when the signs of an extracted watermark are mostly kept the same as those of the original watermark, their correlation values calculated using Eq. (3) may be small. This is because the extracted noise-style watermark is dramatically altered such that the detector response is signi cantly reduced. An advantage of embedding a bipolar watermark instead of a noise-style watermark lies in its capability of tolerating combined attacks or repeated attacks. It is well known that when a noise-style watermark is embedded, the resultant detector response may drop signi cantly when a combined attack or a balanced attack is executed. As for a bipolar watermark, since its value is determined by the sign instead of the magnitude, its corresponding detector response will not be in uenced by a balanced attack or a combined attack.
Complementary E ects of Cocktail Watermarking
As explained in the sequel, the performance of our cocktail watermarking was demonstrated by hiding both noise-style and bipolar watermarks. A tiger image of size 128 128, as shown in Fig. 5(a) , was used in the tests. The length of a hidden watermark depends on the host image and the wavelet-based visual model. Here, its length was 1357. Using our modulation strategy, a total of 2714 wavelet coe cients needed to be modulated. The PSNR of the watermarked image (Fig. 5(b) ) was 34:5 dB. We used 32 di erent attacks to test our cocktail watermarking scheme. The 32 attacked watermarked images are illustrated in Fig. 5 . Among them, the attacked images (labeled (13) to (31)) were generated using PhotoShop while the others were obtained by applying common image processing techniques. The detector responses, CW NRe ( ; ) (without employing the relocation step) with respect to the 32 attacks are plotted in Fig. 6(a) . The two curves clearly demonstrate complementary e ects. It is apparent that one watermark could be destroyed while the other one survived well. From the set of attacked watermarked images, it is not di cult to nd that some attacks severely damaged the watermarked image, but that the embedded watermarks could still be extracted with high detector response. In addition, the probabilities, P A pm and P A nm , which correspond to the positive and the negative modulations (without employing the relocation step), are plotted in Fig. 6(b) . It is obvious that the cocktail watermarking strategy enabled at least one watermark to have a high probability of survival under di erent kinds of attacks. Moreover, the detector responses yielded by CW NRe ( ; ) and CW Re ( ; ) were also compared to identify the signi cance of relocation. Fig. 6(c) shows two sets of detector responses, one for detection with relocation and the other for detection without relocation. From Fig. 6(c) , one can see that the asynchronous phenomena caused by attacks were compensated by the relocation strategy. On the other hand, the result of detecting the bipolar watermark is shown in Fig. 6(d) for comparison. Again, almost all the detector responses were well above a certain threshold except for some detection results.
The cocktail watermarking scheme was also compared with the methods proposed by Cox et al. 4 ] and Podilchuk and Zeng (IA-W) 25] under the same set of attacks. In order to make a fair comparison, the parameters used by Cox et al. 4 ] were adopted. The PSNR of their watermarked image was 29:26 dB. Podilchuk and Zeng's method was image-adaptive and required no extra parameter. The PSNR of their watermarked image was 30:21 dB. In our cocktail watermarking scheme and Podilchuk and Zeng's approach, 3-level wavelet transform was adopted for decomposing the tiger image. Among the three watermarked images generated, respectively, by Cox et al.'s method, Podilchuk and Zeng's method, and our method, our watermarked image had the highest PSNR. In other words, our watermark was the weakest in terms of strength. In order to make the comparison fair, the relocation step which would have made our approach even better was not used. Because the maximum detector responses generated by an attack-free watermarked image with respect to the three compared schemes were di erent, a normalization step was performed so that their maximum correlation values would be the same. A comparison of the detector responses with respect to the 32 attacks for the above three methods is shown in Fig. 7(a) . In addition, the comparisons of the probability P A mentioned in Eq. (12) is displayed in Fig. 7(b) . It is observed that our complementary modulations quite consistently had higher probabilities than did random modulations 4, 25] (except for the 14-th attack) even though our watermark's strength was the weakest. Recall that as we have discussed in Sec. 2.3, greater strength is bene cial for achieving a higher detector response. From the experimental results described above, it is obvious that our scheme outperforms the other two.
Cocktail Watermarking under Combined Attacks
In this section, we will discuss a series of experiments conducted to show how a combined attack would in uence a cocktail watermarked image. It has been found that blurring (B) and histogram equalization (H) are two types of attacks which have extremely di erent e ect on a watermarked image. That is, the blurring operation tends to decrease the magnitudes of most of the wavelet coe cients. Histogram equalization, on the other hand, tends to increase the magnitudes of most of the wavelet coe cients. The purpose of this experiment was to check whether this kind of combination is able to remove the watermark of a cocktail watermarked image. Twenty combined attacks, including B(1st attack), BH(2nd attack), BHB(3rd attack), BHBH, ..., BHBHBHBHBHBHBHBHBHBH(20-th attack), were used. Fig. 8(a) shows the curve of the bipolar watermark detector responses against 20 combined attacks with various lengths. It is not di cult to nd that the results turned out to be good when combined attacks with di erent lengths were applied. In other words, a longer combined attack does not really mean to destroy our cocktail watermarks more seriously. In order to show the capability of watermark detection in uniqueness veri cation under a combined attack, we drew 10000 random marks (including the correct one) to correlate the watermark extracted after the combined attack BH. Fig. 8(a) shows that the detector response under the BH attack was the worst. Fig.   8(b) shows that the detector response corresponding to the correct mark was a small peak among the 10000 random marks. In other words, our cocktail watermarking is still robust under a combined attack.
Cocktail Watermarking under Balanced Attacks with Various Strength
In this section, we shall discuss a series of experiments conducted to show whether the resultant detector responses would drop dramatically when balanced attacks with various strengths were applied. In this series of experiments, the relocation strategy was not used. Balanced attacks, such as Gaussian noise addition, are apt to force the intensity of image pixels to be bounded within a close approximation. Under these circumstances, the intensity of image pixels is just as likely to increase as decrease. Figs. 9(a) (d) show four Gaussian noise added watermarked images (with noise amount 16, 32, 64, and 96, respectively). It is observed that the watermarked images were severely degraded when the amount of added noise increased. Fig. 9(e) shows the curve of the detector responses after noise-type watermark detection. It is noted that when the amount of added noise increased, the detector response dropped signi cantly at rst but tended to stabilize when the amount was increased to 64. It is not di cult to nd that the stabilized curve stayed at a height of 12, but we cannot simply use this result to judge the existence of a hidden watermark. As a consequence, the bipolar watermarks extracted under Gaussian noise addition with amounts of 32 and 64, respectively, were chosen to verify the uniqueness as shown in Figs. 9(g) and (h). From Figs. 9(g) and (h), we can clearly see a peak in Fig.  9 (g) while the peak shown in Fig. 9(h) is not so clear. The best way to solve this problem is to seek the compromise between the false positive probability and the false negative probability discussed in Sec.
4.2. Table 1 and Table 2 listed some estimated results for the purpose of determining an appropriate threshold. Table 1 shows some values of the false negative analysis. p 1 indicates the probability that the hidden watermark values and their corresponding extracted watermark values have the same sign.
From Table 1 it is obvious that p 1 is lower bounded by 0:5 when our cocktail watermarking scheme was applied. In the experiments described in Sec. 5.2, the lowest detector response received among the 32 attacks was 0:3 ( Fig. 6(d) ), but its corresponding p 1 value was 0:65. As to the combined attacks and the balanced attacks discussed in Sec. 5.3 and this section, the lowest detector responses received were both 0:2 (under the constraint that the attacked image was not severely degraded.) Their corresponding p 1 values were both 0:6. In sum, the p 1 values are greater than or equal to 0:6 in most cases. From Table 1 , we can see that the false negative probability corresponding to p 1 = 0:6 and threshold (T )=0:15 was 10 ?3 . That means, the miss detection rate was 0:1%. When T was maintained at 0:15 and the p 1 value was slightly increased to 0:61, the miss detection rate was lowered down to 0:002%. As to the false positive probabilities listed in Table 2 , p 1 was consistently maintained at the value of 0:5 due to the characteristic of randomness. Under the circumstances, when T was set to 0:15, the corresponding false positive probability (false alarm) was 8 10 ?8 , which was negligibly small. Table   1 and Table 2 also listed the false negative and the false positive probabilities when T was set to 0:2. However, we found that when T was equal to 0:15, the trade-o between the false negative probability and the false positive probability was the best.
Conclusion
A cocktail watermarking scheme, which can securely protect images, has been developed in this work. The proposed scheme has two features: (1) embedding two complementary watermarks makes it dicult for attackers to destroy both of them; (2) statistical analysis has provided a lower bound for our cocktail watermarking. Experimental results have demonstrated that our watermarking scheme is extremely robust while still satisfying typical watermarking requirements. To the best of our knowledge, no other reports in the literature have presented techniques that can resist as many di erent attacks as our method can.
Another important feature of the proposed cocktail watermarking technique is that it can be applied to other types of media such as audio or video. In addition to the robustness issue of watermarking addressed in this paper, the rightful ownership deadlock problem, the need for oblivious but robust watermarking techniques, and the capacity problem will be important issues for future research. Figure 1 : Scenarios in the attacking process for negative modulation.`o' denotes the original wavelet coe cient,`m' represents the wavelet coe cient after modulation, and`a' is the coe cient after attacks; positive/negative denote the portion of positive/negative wavelet coe cients; the horizontal/vertical area represents the hiding/attacking quantity: (top gure) hiding using negative modulation; (scenario 1) the behaviors of the hiding and the attacking processes are the same; (scenario 2/scenario 3) the behaviors of the hiding and the attacking processes are di erent, but the strength of the attack is smaller/larger than that of negative modulation. 
